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  Jour of Adv Research in Dynamical & Control Systems, Vol. 11, Issue-07, 2019 435 *Corresponding Author: Sugeng Suharto, Email: sugengsuharto@unib.ac.id Article History: Received: July 06, 2019, Accepted: Sep 26, 2019 Public-Private Partnership: Toll Road Provision as A Public Service in Indonesia  Sugeng Suharto, Bengkulu University, Bengkulu, Indonesia Sujarwoto, Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia  Abstract- The purpose of this study is to analyze the form of cooperation between the government and private sectors towards providing public service infrastructures. This was investigated with the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) approach using a qualitative descriptive method, through an in-depth exploration. In addition, the PPP scheme in Indonesia covers cooperation in transportation infrastructure (toll road construction), electricity (additional infrastructure to increase the thermal generator power by 2000 MW), and water supply (from PAM Jaya). Therefore, the current research tends to focus on providing toll roads as a supporting framework of public transportation.The results showed that during 2015 up to the end of 2019, 894 km had been constructed, encompassing 129 km in 2015, 44 km in 2016, 36 km in 2017, 476 km in 2018, and 209 km as of May 2019. Therefore, the selection of a business entity through the partnership with government in the toll roads operation is conducted by the Indonesia Toll Road Authority or Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol(BPJT). In addition, the procedures for procurement are explained in Presidential Regulation Number 67/2005 and Ministerial Regulation Number PU 13/2010, regarding the planning, the process, determination of winners, and preparation of cooperation agreements.  Keywords: Toll Road, Public-Private Partnership  Introduction Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a form of collaboration between the government and public organizations in providing communal services, in order to fulfill the basic needs of its citizens (Sehgal;Dubey, 2019). These are responsibilities of the state, starting from basic necessities, encompassing clothing, food, residence, health, education, sports, and recreation (Curtain; Betts, 2017). Meanwhile, there is also need to establish related infrastructures, including the establishment of clothing industries, regulation of food circulation, construction of low-cost housing, procurement of hospitals and clinics, educational, sports, and recreation facilities. However, the government does not have enough funds to finance all of these, hence, an opportunity is created for private parties to participate (Domberger& Fernandes,2003). In addition, the capital intensive and infrastructure development projects have been handled and completed independently in developed countries,while for those developing or underdeveloped, there is often a need to involve other countries/sectors (Pattberg,2010). This is performed with mutual consideration on where the government is able to conduct the stipulated programs, while the private sector also obtains profit (Reynaers, 2013). PPPisrequiredto collaborate the government with private sectors in developing countries, although its success is not as optimal, in contrast with the developed country markets. Thus, the achievement of economic goals and improvement with PPP are being questioned (Schmitz,2019).  By exploring the procurement experience in Chile, this article concludes the requisition of domestic or local involvement in the PPP consortium, either through domestic ownership or in domestic/foreign construction partnerships, in the interests of developing countries (Melville, 2017). These forms of participation is likely to ensure the development of domestic engineering and construction companies, subsequently reducing potential negative impacts of the infrastructure markets dominated by foreign influences (Melville,2017)  Relating with the investment in toll roads, about24 private investors were identified to have been operating with concession periods ranging from 23 to 40 years. However, 27 other similar investment projects are also in the preparation phase (Utama, 2010).  
Public-Private Partnership: Toll Road Provision as A Public Service in Indonesia  436   PPP succeedsin several countries   PPP has been appreciated for providing 'the world's second-best private and public involvement, although the complex contractual arrangements, sophisticated financing, and strong institutional involvement tend to makeit an inaccessible tool for numerous developing countries (Palma, 2007). ASside Australia, Europe, and North America, Chile has actually enjoyed some of the biggest successes recorded in terms of infrastructure development promotion through PPP (Melville, 2017). Since 1991, over 50 PPPs, totaling more than US $ 12 billion in capital investment on roads, hospitals, ports, and electricity systems, have been completed, hence, it is established as a role model (Hill, 2011) The existence of complex subcontracting arrangements is often considered as a characteristic of PPP, originated and governed by contracts between the public sector and private legal entities, termed Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV). In addition, the agreement project documents SPV responsibilities, communal obligations, default events, and termination rights of each party, and also the method through which payment is made (Yescombe, 2007) Another consideration is substantial technological modification in regions experienced by PPP, with the rapidlychanging economy, which results in difficulty in regulation, and a recurrent expansion in institutional capacity (Hodge &Greve, 2010). This view is consistent with the failure of private contractual efforts that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England, which were often damaged due to sharp fluctuations in the use of drastic economic changes (Joskow, 2007). Furthermore, there was also a propositiontowards promoting transparency, predictability, and accountability (Marks, 2010), as well as two institutional prerequisites for successful PPP, encompassing independent judiciary and adequate domestic expertise. Meanwhile, amongst the most important reforms(Engel, Fischer &Galetovic, 2014) was the reorganization of institutional protection organizations for its procurement in 2010. Moreover, concession contracts tend to require signatures from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Public Works, within the period of centralization via MOP (Lorensen, Barrientos, &Babbar, 2001). This amendment was conducted together with the introduction of the Concession Board advising PPP strategic development programs, designed to improve external regulatory oversight (Bennet,2010). Furthermore, within its main concession(i.e Coordination General de Concessions), MOP created four branches, where the three main outlets were - the project, construction, and operation (Martinis &Moyan). These are collectively responsible for projects at different times in the PPP life cycle, althoughthey were conducted under a central procurement agency. Therefore, the structure ensures that projects are overseen by different teams, subsequently allowing the development of institutional expertise, and ensuring a new pair of eyes on each handover, alongside minimizing 'catches'potential (Engel, Fischer, &Galetovic, 2014).  Domestic Involvement Case In a book entitled Menendang Tangga da Buruk Samaria, Ha-Joon Chang criticized the potential success of implementing neoliberal economic policies in developing countries, alongside the advocation for developing countries to adopt a more nationalist or patriotic model (Chang, 2008). Furthermore, the experiences of Britain, the United States and, South Korea in their development,were also highlighted for emphasis, on instances where the domestic companies and industries were 'nurtured'. This was conducted to the point where it was established that they werestrong enough to compete in the global market, e.g., the Buy America Act 1933 (Chang, 2008). In addition, numerous obstacles, encompassing rates and subsidies have been banned by the World Trade Organization (WTO), something Chang described as 'menendang tangga' or ‘kicking the ladder’ for developing countries (Chang, 2008). This view gained support amongst development economists that were critical of multinational companies, subsequently leading to domestic business discharges (Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2008). Moreover, foreign companies tend to maintain corporate functions in their country of origin and display fewer physical connections to developing countries. This was toensure sufficient flexibility to leave those that experience a fast economic time, or on instances of exchange rate volatility. Specifically, professional roles within the construction sector, encompassing project managers, assessors, and schedulers tend to be sourced from the contractor's country (Wells & Hawkins, 2010), indicating the increased probability of having unskilled and underpaid workers make up the majority of local jobs created. This, therefore, increases the propensity for dependence on foreign companies to worsen the economy in times of volatility, e.g., the 56 percent of foreign financial institutions in Ireland in 2009 (Claessens& van Horen, 2012).    PPP in Indonesia 
  Jour of Adv Research in Dynamical & Control Systems, Vol. 11, Issue-07, 2019 437 *Corresponding Author: Sugeng Suharto, Email: sugengsuharto@unib.ac.id Article History: Received: July 06, 2019, Accepted: Sep 26, 2019 In Indonesia, PPP is known as Kerjasama Pemerintah dengan Badan Usaha (KPBU),and defined as the cooperation between government and business entities towards the provision of infrastructure for public interest. This is attained by referring to specifications predetermined by the Minister/Head of Institution/Regional Head/BUMN/BUMD, which partially or wholly utilizes business resources by considering the distribution of risk between related parties (Djkn, 2010). Furthermore, the cooperation was identified right from the New Order era, as seen in toll roads construction and electricity supply, althoughdevelopment ensued in 1998, following the monetary crisis. Moreover, after being preceded by several supporting regulations, the Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2015 was issued, concerning Kerjasama Pemerintah dengan Badan Usaha (KPBU) or Government Cooperation with Business Entities in the infrastructureprovision. This further prompted the collaboration that was previously known as Kerjasama Pemerintah Swasta (KPS) becomesKPBU (Utama, 2010) The limitations of the state budget/APBN in financing infrastructural developments stipulated in the 2015-2019 RPJMN have led to funding gaps.Therefore, the government is required to adopt several alternative means, one of which requiresthe use of a development cooperation scheme, involving the private sector, also known as the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) (Djkn, 2019). In addition, institutions that play a direct role in this implementation of the PPP include the Ministry of PPN/BAPPENAS as the coordinator, the Ministry of Finance through the DJPPR, centered on providing governmental support and guarantees, as well as the Ministries/Institutions/Regions/BUMN/BUMD as PJPK. Meanwhile, supporting organizations have also been formed, within acceleration stage, encompassing (1) Komite Kebijakan Percepatan Penyediaan Infrastruktur (KKPPI), which has been replaced by KomitePercepatanPenyediaanInfrastrukturPrioritas (KPPIP), (2) PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI), known to play the role of a Preparatory Body in the assistance and/or financing to PJPK, and (3) PT PenjaminanInfrastruktur Indonesia (PII), serving as an instrument to guarantee infrastructure development. (Djkn, 2019)  Toll Road Construction in Indonesia One of the provisions of transportation infrastructure conducted in collaboration with PPP is the creation of toll roads. This study, therefore, examines the constructions that took place in Indonesia between 2015 and 2019. In addition, the monitoring of the Toll Road Authority (BPJT) reported that the target of 1000 km has been far exceeded, as the development reached 894 km by May 2019 (BPPT, 2019).The following table is a list of toll roads on Java Island included in the Trans-Java Toll Road Network, which connects Merak with Banyuwangi.  Table 1. Trans-Java Toll Road Section Operating in 2015 - 2019 TollSection Company Length (km) Official year Cikopo-Palimanan Toll Road PT Lintas MargaSedaya 116 2015 PT HutamaKarya Cikopo – PalimananToll Road PT HutamaKarya 44 2016 Pejagan-Pemalang Toll Road PT PejaganPemalang Toll Road 57 2018 Pemalang-Batang Toll Road PT PemalangBatang Toll Road 39 2018 Semarang-Batang Toll Road PT Jasamarga Semarang Batang 75 2018 Semarang–Solo Toll Road PT Trans MargaJateng 75 2018 PT Jasamarga Solo Ngawi Solo-Ngawi Toll Road 90 2018 Ngawi-Kertosono Toll Road PT JasamargaNgawiKertosono Kediri 87 2018 
Public-Private Partnership: Toll Road Provision as A Public Service in Indonesia  438   The following table presents the toll roads in Java Island that do not belong to the Trans-Java Toll Road Network, but is included in the National Strategic Project  Table 2. Non-Trans-Java Toll Road Section Operating in 2015 - 2019 Toll Section Company Length Official year       Gempol-Pandaan Toll Road PT JasamargaPandaan Tol 13 2015 Total   13    Table 1 and Table 2 above shows the construction of an extreme toll road along 476 km or 53,2% of the total temporary length of 894 km in 2018. This was termed “temporary” because it has only been running for 5 months in 2019, and also, it was observed that44 km (4.9%)was constructed in 2016, while the second-longest was built in 2019 (23,4%). Moreover, in 2015, only 129 km (14,4%) was completed and 36 km (4.0%) in 2017, and the data obtained are presented in the Pie graph as follows:    Figure 1. Provision of Trans-Java and Non-Trans-Java Tolls in percentage (%)  This 2019, Trans-Sumatra Toll Road is expected to operate along 561 km of the total 2,765 km project, although 90.19% in Balikpapan-Samarinda (99.35 km) has been completed and is expected to function by the end of 2019. Danang reportedthat 20 percent of the total composition of concession owners are privately conceded, and 70 percent are state-owned enterprise/BUMN. According to the BPJT evaluation, it is assumed that these operations possess the capacity tomore optimally encourage the flow of people and goods, and the future use of technology areof particular concern (BPPT, 2019). One solution adopted by the government in providing toll roads is the existence of a State Capital Participation or Penyertaan Modal Negara (PMN) to State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN),focused on infrastructure projects (Utama, 2010). In addition, the constraints related to constructions include 15%5%4%53%23%Toll Road2015 2016 2017 2018 2019Kertosono-Mojokerto Toll Road PT MargaHarjayaInfrastruktur 40 2018 Surabaya-Mojokerto Toll Road PT Jasamarga Surabaya Mojokerto 36 2017 Gempol-Pasuruan Toll Road PT TransmargaJatimPasuruan 13 2018 Pasuruan–Probolinggo Toll Road PT Trans JawaPaspro Jalan Tol 45 2019 Probolinggo-Banyuwangi Toll Road PT JasamargaProbolinggoBanyuwangi 164 2019 Total Length  881  
  Jour of Adv Research in Dynamical & Control Systems, Vol. 11, Issue-07, 2019 439 *Corresponding Author: Sugeng Suharto, Email: sugengsuharto@unib.ac.id Article History: Received: July 06, 2019, Accepted: Sep 26, 2019 44%land acquisition (44%), inadequate planning, and preparation (25%), limited funding (17%), and permits by 12% (Djkn, 2019). Furthermore, in July 2019, the Tanjung Priok Toll Road (TPATR) project was also constructed,due to the increase in cargo at the port terminal area in Tanjung Priok to 3.8 million TEU containers, and 27.5 million tons in 2019, as wellas a 7.6% and 2.7% elevation within the last 15 years (Jica, 2011). Furthermore, the PPP scheme was selected to meet funding needs, enhance the role of private sectors in accelerating infrastructural development within Indonesia, and generate value for money (Alfen, et al, 2009, Michel & Zhon, 2003, Susantono & Berawi, 2012).  Conclusion The Indonesian government provides toll roads as a supporting infrastructure for transportation, in an attempt to accomplish public services. However, with reference to the limitations of the state budget, collaborations with the private sector using Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme are often performed. These practices are conducted with the target of constructing a 1000 km toll road by the end of 2019. Moreover, during the course of this research (July 2019), the total length attained throughout the Indonesian territory was observed to have reached 894 km, hence there is a possibility of attaining the target of 1000 km by the end of 2019. In addition, the toll roads constructed include Trans-Java, Non-Trans-Java, Trans Sumatra, Trans-Kalimantan, and Trans Sulawesi., as well as the extreme progress performed at the Trans-Java area in 2018, which connects Banten (Merak) to Banyuwangi East Java. The provision of public services in the form of toll road construction runs with the PPP scheme, initiated by the preparation, implementation, determination of the project winner. This is followed by the arrangements for a cooperation agreement, where various obstacles were also encountered, encompassing land acquisition during preparation, as well as auction arrangement during implementation, and the determination of project cooperation. Furthermore, all practices were conducted as a manifestation of government policy in the context of providing public service infrastructure.  References [1] Alfen, H. W., Kalidindi, S. N., Ogunlana, S., Wang, S., Abednego, M. P., Frank-Jungbecker, A., . . . Singh, L. (2009). Public-private partnership in infrastructure development: case studies from Asia and Europe: Weimar: Verlag der Bauhaus-Universität.  [2] Allan, J. R. (1999). “Public-private partnerships: A review of literature and practice”. Saskachewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy Paper No. 4  [3] Bennett, Anthony. 2009, Suistainable public/ private partnership for public service delivery, Development journal, vol 3 issues 2 [4] Chang, H. J. (2008). Bad samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history ofcapitalism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press. [5] Claessens, S., & van Horen, N. (2012). Foreign banks: Trends, impact and financial stability (IMF Working Paper, 12/10, pp. 1–39). Washington, DC: IMF [6] Curtain, Kim., & Betts, Jim. 2017, Bosting Some of the Public Private Partnership Myths from a Government Perpective, Australian Journal of Public Administration (AJIPA), Volume 76, No 3. [7] M I Ahmed,”A Compact Triangular Ring Patch Antenna For Radio Location And Fixed Satellite Applications”,National Journal Of Antennas And Propagation, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2019 [8] Cuttaree, Vickram. 2008. Successes and Failures of PPP Projects. The World Bank Europe and Central Asia Region:  Warsaw  [9] Denormandie, Cecile. 2011. Public Private Partnership for Urban Water Utilities: The Senegalese Experience. [10] Pb Agus Ristono*,”Design Of Reliable And Efficient Manchester Carry Chain Adder Based 8-Bit Alu For High Speed Applications”,Journal Of VLSI Circuits And Systems, 1 (01), 1-4,2019 [11] Domberger, Simon & Fernandez, Patrick, 1999. Public Private Partnership for Service Delivery, London School Business Review, vol 10 issue 4 [12] Engel, E., Fischer, R., &Galetovic, A. (2014). The economics of public–private partnerships: A basic guide (p. 23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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